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Context
India’s 65 million Muslim women, often called a minority within a minority
their double handicap of gender and faith, are challenging medieval religious
laws that have oppressed them for centuries. In recent years, Muslim women
have fought fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic law (Sharia), which
have long allowed men in India to divorce their wives for trivial matters
and deny them financial support, asking the courts to take into consideration
basic human rights. This is very much evident from the reaction of Muslim
women against the release of model nikahnama and the clauses mentioned
in this regarding marital issues.
The recent release of model Nikahnama by the All India Muslim
Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) and its campaign over establishing and
strengthening  Shariat Courts/Darul Qazas in order to dispense quick justice
to women according to the Quran has created confusion and debate within
and outside the community. In presidential address of AIMPLB Bhopal
convention in 2005, the president of AIMPLB, Sayyed Muhammad Rabe
Hasani Nadvi, made the statement once again claiming that Darul Qazas
were a necessity because there was little hope for getting decisions based
on the Shariah from judges in state court’. He further insisted upon the
need for Darul Qazas throughout the country and opposed Muslims taking
their disputes to non-Muslim judges, a practice that he argues is ‘not in
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2keeping with the mentality and the spirit of the Shariah of Islam’. He stated
that setting up separate Darul Qazas is a means to ensure that ‘the Shariah
is applied by those most knowledgeable of it’ (Sikand 2005).
This move has made the matrimonial issues and problems faced by
women, more complicated and stirred a debate about the legality and
sanctity of these courts under  Indian legal system. For instance, the last
section of the model Nikahnama on Iqrarnama says: ‘… agar khuda-na-
khwasta kisi wajah se hamare dermian koyee nazaa paida ho jaye to darul
kaza….sharyeee panchayat, mustanad alimdeen hamare dermian salis hoga
aur wo job bhi faisla karega ham dono uske paband rahenge’(God forbidden
for some reasons if some misunderstading is created between us, in that
case Darul Qaza, Sharyee Panchayat, Ulema would take the decision and
whatever judgment he gives would be binding on us). This clause apparently
closes the option for women to approach the secular courts.
The indifferent approach of the AIMPLB clearly indicates the deep-
seated patriarchal attitude of conservative Islam, which undermines
women’s rights in contradiction to the Holy Quran. The subjugation of
women is often justified as being under the doctrines of the Shari‘ah.
However, the Islamic Shari‘ah encompass not only religious doctrines, but
also human reasoning and consensus shaped by social and cultural values
of society. That is the reason Shari‘ah is not implemented uniformly across
Islamic world. Unfortunately AIMPLB seem to be least bothered about the
diversity and heterogeneity of Muslim community in India.
In response to the establishment of Shariat Courts/Darul Qazas and
the stand of All India Muslim Personal Law Board, advocate Vishwa Lochan
Madan filed a Public Interest Letigation seeking immediate dissolution of
all Islamic and Shariat Courts in India, and requested the Court to direct
the Centre and the States to take effective steps to dissolve all Darul Qazas
and Shariat Courts. It had sought a direction from the Court to restrain
these organisations from interfering with the marital status of Indian Muslim
citizens, and passing any judgment, remarks or fatwas (decrees) as well as
deciding matrimonial disputes amongst Muslims. Further, the petitioner
sought a direction from the Court to AIMPLB and Darul Ulooms in the
country ‘not to train or appoint qazis, naib-qazis or muftis for rendering
any judicial service of any kind’. On 17 August 2005, the Indian Supreme
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most important Muslim bodies in India), to reply to a petition filed against
them. The petition charge the two organisation with interfering with the
country’s legal system and introducing parallel Islamic laws in violation of
the Constitution, and sought directions to restrain the board from
establishing a parallel Muslim judicial system or Nizam-e-Qaza (http://
www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=373114).
In the light of the above debates and discussions about giving rights
to Muslim women and dispensing of quick justice according to Islamic
provision, and the argument in favour or against the establishment and
strengthening of Shariat Courts by AIMPLB, the main issue is how far the
AIMPLB’s insistence on Shariat Courts is justified in a secular democratic
state. Further, why do they want to deprive women of their citizenship
rights? Why they are not taking initiative to make divorce laws in accordance
with the Quran, despite women’s organization continuous demand for
making personal law gender-just? This paper deals with the some of these
issues.
Statement of the Problem
The All India Muslim Personal Law Board justify its stand for Shariat Courts
by emphasising that all family disputes need to resolved among themselves,
through Shariah Courts manned by traditionalist ‘ulama, rather than the
State Courts, which the ‘ulama look upon with considerable suspicion and
distaste even though the latter apply Muslim Personal Law in such matters,
as being an ‘Islamic duty’. In order to protect Islamic identity in India, they
insist that the state must arm Shariah Courts set up by ulema organisations
with legal authority extending to all Muslim Indians in matters related to
civil disputes in which both parties are Muslims. The decrees issued by
these courts in such disputes, it is suggested, should be recognised by the
state as final and binding (Sikand 2005).
Further, they argue that non-Muslim judges are not capable of
judging such disputes in accordance with Shariah. They also claimed that
state courts might deliberately seek to ‘misinterpret’ the Shariah, which
they see as part of an alleged ‘conspiracy’ to destroy Muslim identity and
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claimed that Shariah Courts might be a cheaper and faster mechanism for
dispensing justice. However, these arguments seem to strengthen the
authority and powers of the Ulema, who possess a very conservative view
towards women’s rights. Their advocacy of Shariah courts probably has a
gender bias behind it, as they realise that state courts might interpret the
Shariah, in the form of Muslim Personal Law, in a manner that departs
from traditional fiqh, and thereby grant,more rights to women than the
‘Ulema are prepared to concede.
To my mind these ongoing debates either in favour or against these
courts to a large extent, diverts the main issue of women’s rights in
matrimonial matters. While on the one hand, as stated earlier, the Muslim
Personal law board declared its intention to set up these courts seemingly
in order to dispense quick justice to women according to the Quran, on the
other hand, the conservative element from the majority community saw
this as an opportunity to raise the issue for a uniform civil code (UCC). The
political leaders, for their part, take this opportunity to appease Muslims
and safeguard their vote bank. Surprisingly, none of them seems really
concerned about the genuine problems of Muslim women, which the latter
have been facing in matters related to marriage and divorce, and the pathetic
condition of the victims of instant triple divorce who are left with no support.
For instance, the MPLB, despite knowing  too well that current triple talaq
does not follow true Islamic guidance, is opposing the reform of a system
that is oppressive when it comes to women. They never tried to transform
the pronouncement of triple divorce in accordance with to which that is
stated in the Quran, which is a long due demand of Muslim women’s
organisations (in 2001, the AIMPLB organised a two-day meeting with
women’s organisations, in which there was a demand from all women’s
organisations to change the triple talaq system according to the Quran.
However, no action was taken. The model nikhanama does not say a word
about banning triple talaq, which reflects the gender insensitivity of the
members of MPLB), but started advocating for establishing and
strengthening Shariat Courts in its model Nikahnama, which was released
in 2005.
5In this context, the campaign to establish and strengthen Shariah Courts
may be seen as diverting the attention of various Muslim women’s
organisations, which have started to mount an effective critique of the
mullahs, accusing them of preaching male supremacy in the name of Islam.
These women argue that Islam stands for gender equality and justice, and
hence seem to be fiercely denouncing the patriarchal laws that the
conservative mullahs seek to pass off in the name of the Shariah. For instance,
in a conference organised by the MPLB in 2001 (7-8 April) with 40 women’s
organisations, the declaration stressed upon the plea to the Government of
India for the establishment of Darul Qaza (Islamic judicial panchayats) as
well as Shariah benches within the Family Court system, which was not
supported by women’s organisations. . Hence, the appeal by certain Ulema
associations to Muslims to set up Shariah Courts and abide by their dictates
could be seen as a means to silence the voices of women such as those
associated with the newly-formed Muslim Women’s Personal Law Boards,
and different Muslim women’s organisations
Main Objectives
The main thrust of this paper is: Why should women go to these courts to
settle matrimonial disputes while there are provisions for them in secular
courts? Do women face less harassment and get quick justice according to
Islamic law by approaching these courts? Who are the women who approach
these courts? Should the mode of justice not it be left to the women to
decide? Who would guarantee the efficacy of Darul Qazas, the quality of
the presiding judges, the efficiency of the proceedings? Can the Board be
allowed to take away the right of Indian Muslim women to knock on the
doors of Indian courts? Does the Board have the authority to restrict Indian
women’s access to the courts for justice? The paper is based on the
experiences of 20 women who went to these courts for Khula, fask-e-nikah,
and the settlement of maintenance, mehr, and the articles given at the time
of marriage.
The study was conducted in the towns of Darbhanga, Madhubani,
Sakri and Jale of the Darbhanga Commissionary of Bihar. The information
was collected through in-depth case studies of each woman by the researcher
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mobility of Muslim women in India’ under the Indian Council of Social
Science Research, New Delhi, the divorced women were identified. From
that sample, the women who initiated divorce were chosen for case studies.
The cases were from the central Shariat Court at Phulwari Sharif, Patna
and the district Shariat Court, Muzafferpur.
Shariat courts (Darul Qaza) and the All India Muslim Personal
Law Board (AIMPLB)
Shariat court/Darul Qaza is an Arabic term, which means the house of Qazi
or an Islamic scholar, who is authorised to give his views which, however,
are not binding on the person going to this house. It is wrong to describe a
Darul Qaza as an Islamic court. Shariat Courts are arbitration councils which
have no real or claimed judicial powers or authority whatsoever. Hence,
these councils cannot be termed as a ‘parallel system’ by any stretch of the
imagination, unlike what is (mis)understood by many within and outside
the community. Their verdicts are nothing more than recommendations
and advice. It is entirely up to the two parties to accept the verdict or reject
it. In case of rejection, the so-called ‘Shariat Courts’ are powerless, and the
Muslim community at large enjoys no authority to coerce the rejecting
party or enforce the verdict (Zafarul-Islam Khan 2005).
It is to be mentioned here that only the AIMPLB and Imarat-e
Shar’iyah Bihar and Orissa have a few dozen of such ‘Shariah Courts’ in
some cities and towns. The system has been functional in Bihar since 1917
(which I am going to elaborate further), where Shariat Courts have decided
18,000 cases. The decisions have also been upheld by law courts. The fact
is, of the 22 shariah courts established by the AIMPLB in the country from
1973 onwards, only 6,433 cases have been disposed of and a negligible 461
cases are still under trial. Further, only 31,775 cases have been decided so
far in the 26 Shariah Courts functioning under the Deobandi Imarat-e
Shariah in Bihar, which has been in existence, as stated earlier, since 1917.
These figures are enough to show that not many Muslims are enthusiastic
about the Shariah Courts, otherwise the number of cases handled would
have been significantly higher, considering the fact that Indian Muslims
7number a staggering 150 million (Sikand 2005). A similar initiative is that
of the Imarat-i Shariah of northeast India, which has 88 Darul Qazas under
its supervision. For its part, the AIMPLB has a number of similar Shariah
Courts affiliated to it, including one in Tamil Nadu, two in Delhi, three in
Madhya Pradesh, four in Andhra Pradesh, five each in Uttar Pradesh and
Karnataka, and eleven in Maharashtra. A Shariat Court has been functioning
in Bhopal since the time of nawabi rule. It is the only Shariat Court in India
which gets a government grant of Rs 60 lakh per annum. In Bhatkal, in
coastal Karnataka, a Shariat court has been dispensing justice since the 18th
century, and has dealt with about 18,000 cases so far (The Hindu 2006).
Other ‘Darul Qazas’ are local and autonomous bodies established by people
in various towns and villages. In any case, these so-called ‘courts’ deal only
with personal law issues like marriage, divorce and inheritance, where both
parties are Muslim.
The Board’s assistant general secretary, Abdul Rahim Qureishi, said
that ‘Darool Khazas’ were formed to decide cases according to the Muslim
Shariat law. These courts are not a parallel system of justice; rather, they
form a system of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) that is prevalent the
world over. He further said that Darul Qazas do not infringe on the law of
the land as they were provided for under Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian
Constitution. It was on this account that the Shariat Application Act of
1937 was enacted. They are far from interfering with the judicial system of
the land. Darul Qazas come in handy in reducing the burden on courts by
disposing of matters related to family disputes, marriage, and inheritance
of Muslims (Pradhan 2005).
Thus, the Shariat Court operates within the Indian constitution and
deals with cases pertaining to marriage, inheritance and succession. As an
ADR mechanism, the Shariat law ensures speedy justice in hundreds of
cases filed by ordinary people.
It would be worth mentioning that since its inception in 1973, the
Board has been consistently demanding the setting up of Darul Qazas in
order to administer what it describes as ‘Islamic justice’. This effort has
gained considerable momentum in recent years. The logic they provide is
that secular courts do not have the authority to either interpret or apply
the Shariat, which is based on the Quran and the Hadith. Hence, that right
8belongs to the ‘Sharia Courts’ alone. This was stated at the AIMPLB’s
conference in Bhopal in 2005, when the members encouraged Muslims to
take their differences to ‘Shariat Courts’ — as against going to the local
ulema or alim as had been the practice. Mufti Ahmed Devalvi of Jamia
Uloomul Quran, Jambusar, expressed the opinion that being believers of
the faith, Muslims must accept the sharia tenets in resolving their disputes
without thinking much about the outcome of the disputes.
The Board’s recent publication of two-part Urdu booklet, ‘Nizam-e
Qaza Ka Qayyam’ (‘The Establishment for a System of Islamic Justice’)
describes the need to establish a separate system of ‘Islamic courts’ in the
country. The booklet describes the need for such courts as an Islamic
necessity, and argues that Muslims are bound to govern their lives in
accordance with the laws of the shariah if they are to remain true to the
dictates of their faith. True justice can only be had by following God’s laws,
which the booklet equates with the traditional understanding of the shariah
upheld by the ‘ulama. Not following these laws is described as a ‘great crime’,
which the Qur’an is said to condemn as ‘infidelity’ (kufr) and ‘oppression’
(zulm). The booklet restricts its advocacy of Shariah laws to the personal
sphere, covering family matters such as marriage, divorce, adoption and
inheritance. Notwithstanding the fact that the Indian Constitution
recognises Muslim Personal Law and Indian courts are empowered to deal
with cases under this law, the booklet demands that Muslims set up their
own courts headed by trained ‘Ulema to solve their own disputes instead of
taking them to the state courts.
Tayyebji, the rector of the Deoband madrasa who served as the first
president of the AIMPLB, insisted on the need for Muslims to have their
personal disputes judged by Muslim Qazis in separate Darul Qazas, and not
in secular courts even if the latter recognise and apply the Muslim Personal
Law. In the words of Sikand (2005),
Although, for obvious reasons, Tayyeb does not explicitly say this,
he seems to argue that ideally Muslims must follow only Islamic laws in all
spheres of life. However, recognizing the impossibility of this as long as
Muslims remain a minority in India, he stresses that they must do so at least
in their personal affairs, in matters presently governed under Muslim
Personal Law, the only aspect of the Shariah that has legal sanction in India
9today. Despite the fact that Muslim Personal Law is recognized by the Indian
state, Tayyeb, echoing the views of the ‘ulama associated with the AIMPLB,
insisted on the need for Muslims to have their own parallel system of courts
to judge their personal affairs. He even suggested the need for Muslims to
elect, unanimously or by majority vote, their own leader (amir) at the all-
India level, whom all Muslims must obey. Through this, he quotes a noted
fellow Deobandi ‘alim as declaring, ‘All the problems that Muslims are today
confronted with would be solved’.
Muslim personal Law and Women’s rights: Debates for Reform
Reform in Muslim Personal Law is a hotly debated issue in India today.
Many traditional ‘Ulemas are averse to any change in the law as it exists.
They see it as divinely revealed, as an integral part of the Shari‘ah. Hence,
they consider changes in the law as tantamount to interfering with the
Shari‘ah. On the other hand, some Muslim modernists have been
consistently critiquing aspects of the Muslim Personal Law as it exists in
India today, particularly those that are seen as militating against gender
justice. They argue that they do not actually represent the spirit of the
Shari‘ah, but, rather, is a deviation from it. However, there has hardly been
any dialogue between the two as to how to go about the reform.
Muhammad Mujib, a noted Islamic scholar and historian, had
described the Shariah as a human approach to the divine will. It is quite an
apt description of the evolution of the Shariah laws. And, besides new
creative interpretations, there is tremendous scope for what is called
borrowing from another school if one’s own school is creating a problem.
This practice was followed in Turkey during the Ottoman period in as early
as the nineteenth century. This method was also followed while drafting
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939. When Muslim women found
it problematic to wait for 90 years if their husbands were missing as stated
in the dictates of the Hanafi School, the Ulema, in order to overcome this
difficulty, borrowed a rule from the Maliki School, which allows the woman
to wait only for a period of four years.
There is a strong argument amongst the orthodox groups in India
against abolishing the practice of triple talaq in one sitting, which they
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think is based on the Shariat or the Divine Law. While on the one hand the
orthodoxy’s strongest argument against abolishing this practice has always
been that it is based on the Shariat, liberals push for a more contemporary
understanding of the genesis of these Divine Laws. The original message in
the Quran was in its intent and design both radical and humanitarian. The
corpus of rules articulated centuries after the death of Prophet Mohammad
by the Muslim establishment in the light of the dominant patriarchal ethos
of the emerging society were incorporated as the Shariat. Liberals point out
that the rules characterised by the Ulemas as Sharia, despite being entirely
the creation of a human agency, became vested with the sanctity of being
either revealed or divine. In addition, in India, the Anglo-Mohammedan
law evolved by colonial courts in their effort to apply the laws of the Quran
(in cases where the parties were Muslim) also began to be construed as part
of the Shariat. These laws, the handiwork of those who were not even
nominally Muslim, were justified through the legal fiction that the courts
were not interpreting the Shariat, but merely applying it (Wadhwa 2004).
During the Indian struggle for independence, one of the
compromises forged between the leadership of the Indian National Congress
led by Gandhi and Nehru and the Jami’at ul-Ulama-i-Hind was that Islamic
laws would not be abolished after independence. Even though the ideal of
a Uniform Civil Code is written into the directive principles of the nation,
Muslims in India continue to be governed by the Muslim Personal Law.
Interestingly, what is called Muslim Personal Law today was termed Anglo-
Mohammedan law until 1947, and was an invention of British magistrates,
judges, and the Privy Council. It is certainly not the Shariat.
However, when the Constitution was adopted in 1950, laws relating
to marriage and divorce, infants, minors, adoption, etc. (in short, ‘personal
laws’), came under the concurrent list, that is, became a subject on which
both the Parliament and the state legislatures can create laws.
The post-colonial government passed the Hindu Code Bill and enacted it,
banning polygamy and transforming a number of traditional Hindu family
laws, but the Muslim leadership never made any attempt to bring about
reforms in the Muslim Personal Law.
11
Thus, while the personal laws of Hindus were substantially codified under
the various Acts in the 1950s (the Hindu Marriage Act, Family Act, Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, etc.), which were also extended to the
Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs, the Muslims continued to be governed by the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (the only exception
to this is the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986,
which was done more out of political necessity and expediency than to
benefit Muslim women.
In the early 1960s, the Union cabinet received some suggestions for
reforms in Muslim Personal Law on the plea of changes that have taken
place in Muslim countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, Iran and
Turkey. In 1963, the government appointed a committee comprising Muslim
leaders like Humayun Kabir, Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim, Muzaffar Hussain,
and Jamia Vice-Chancellor Mohammad Mujib. This move opened the way
for debates on this issue. Tahir Mahmood, the then Associate Professor at
the Indian Law Institute, carried out a survey on the state of the Muslim
Personal Law in 20 countries, and found that the Shariat was not applied
uniformly in all of them. ‘Turkey, Cyprus, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq and Iran
do not give a Muslim husband right to divorce his wife unilaterally. It says
that a Muslim husband seeking divorce from his wife must apply to the
court of Law’ (Gani 1978: 25-27). This showed that flexibility is possible.
This issue also figured at the International Congress of Orientalists, held in
Delhi in 1964, which stirred up a countrywide debate on the subject.
Contrary to the changes in Islamic rules that occurred in various
Muslim countries, the Muslim leadership in India, with the support of some
Islamic institutions, are stating that changes in the Muslim Personal Law
are tantamount to an infringement of the religious rights of the followers
of Islam. They have gone to the extent of declaring that any change would
amount to an attempt to Hinduise Muslims. To put an end to the endless
debate on the issue of the Muslim Personal Law, they organised a wide
range of seminars and conventions in the early 1970s which were all
aggressively opposed the move, and thus forced the government and the
committee constituted in 1963 to place the issue in cold storage.
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Hence, ‘the Muslims consider the personal law to be an essential part of
their religion and stand therefore for status quo’ (ibid.). Any move to reform
the Muslim Personal Law is viewed as destroying the community identity
and secular character of the state. On the one hand, there exists a basic
contradiction in ‘secular’ laws that include religious provisions. On the other
hand, there exists a Muslim community resistant to change, which claims
that any change to its coveted personal law will result in the destruction of
Muslim ‘culture and identity’ in India. Mushirul Hasan (2000: 10) writes:
‘The demand for reforms is interpreted as an attempt to destroy “Muslim
identity”’. Since the British, as noted above, were not interested in a direct
confrontation with the Muslim community with regard to the Personal
Law and since the Personal Laws left to Muslims under the Shariat Act had
mostly to do with women’s issues such as marriage, divorce, and
maintenance, it was logical that a women’s movement would challenge
these issues. The modern interpretation of British rule is that it actually
resulted in an ‘erosion’ of women’s rights. It has been proved that when the
British arrived in India, Muslim women actually possessed more rights than
their Hindu counterparts. This is due in part to regulations in the Quran
regarding mehr, divorce and maintenance. Till date, the personal law
contains the same issues that are directly related to the rights of women,
and any reform in this sphere is viewed as interfering with religious freedom.
Fyzee, in a small booklet (1971), pointed out that there was an urgent
need for reform in the MPL in order to address the question of gender
justice. Given the inequities inherent in some rules of the traditional fiqh,
and in certain provisions in the MPL that impinge on Muslim women’s
rights, Fyzee proposed a radical legal reform, which he saw would guarantee
gender, while at the same time retaining the MPL. In his book he suggested
that the Indian Parliament pass a new law, which he termed ‘The Muslim
Personal Law [Miscellaneous Provisions] Act’, which would modify the
existing MPL. In order to ensure that Muslims accept the proposed
legislation, he suggested measures for legal reform based on rules accepted
by one or the other school of Islamic law (mazhab) in order to uphold the
principles of justice and equity. This measure would also help open up each
school to the possibility of borrowing from other Muslim schools, and would
in this way help promote a measure of intra-Muslim ecumenism.
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Thus, he suggested that the proposed act lay down that ‘where a Muslim is
governed by a particular school of law and a decision according to that
school would be against justice, equity and good conscience, the Court shall
have the discretion to apply a rule drawn from any of the other schools of
Islamic law, Sunnite as well as Shi’ite’ (Upadhyay 2003).
Fyzee viewed that legal reform in personal law through inter-
mazhab eclecticism would address the crucial and genuine concerns of
Muslim women, while at the same time fulfilling the need for such reform
to be seen as Islamically acceptable, particularly in the procedure for divorce.
For instance, three talaqs uttered by a husband in one sitting, even under
compulsion or under the influence of alcohol, are considered a binding
divorce according to most Hanafi Sunnis, who form the vast majority of
Muslims in India. However, this rule is not accepted by several other
mazhabs (other schools of jurisprudence), such as the Shafi’is and the Ahl-
i Hadith among the Sunnis, and the Ithna Asharis and Musta’lian Isma’ilis
or Bohras among the Shi’as. And hence, he suggested that the courts apply
the more liberal rule drawn from the Shafi’i, Ahl-i Hadith or Shi’a schools
in a case involving triple talaq in one sitting, even if the parties to the dispute
were both Hanafi Sunnis.
Henceforth, he argues that justice is the underlying principle of the
Shari’a, and if any laws that claimed to be Islamic failed to provide justice,
they could be considered to be in contravention of the Shari’a and, therefore,
of God’s will as well. He also stressed that certain laws that form part of the
MPL indeed violate this principle, particularly on some matters related to
women. Hence, in order to uphold the principle of justice, they needed to
be changed.
Anticipating that this proposal would be opposed by large sections
of the conservative Ulema, he claimed that legal reform in this sphere would
not be tantamount to changing the Shari’a, nor would it violate the principle
of freedom of religion guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. This is so
because the Shari’a and fiqh were two distinct, but related, entities, although
most Ulema tended to take them as synonymous (Fyzee 1971).
To stress on his suggestion for change, he further pointed out that
the MPL as it exists today cannot be regarded as the pure Shari’a. In his
words, the MPL in India is ‘a discrete body of law and custom, varying
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considerably from the rules of the Shari’a as expounded in the classical
texts’ (Sikand 2005: 93). Hence, reforms in the MPL need not necessarily be
seen as interfering with or modifying the Shari’a. To strengthen his
argument, he pointed out that the MPL was itself a product of the interaction
between traditional Islamic jurisprudence and the British colonial legal
system, and was, therefore, not equivalent to the Shari’a itself. In preparing
the principles and details of Anglo-Mohammedan Law, colonial jurists drew
heavily on British notions of equity and justice, in the process modifying
the traditional fiqh in several important respects. Thereby, the British did
away with Islamic criminal law and even with certain traditional laws
relating to personal affairs. For instance, the traditional fiqh rule that
required that the judge adjudicating a case between two Muslims himself
be a Muslim was scrapped, slavery upheld by the traditional jurisprudents
was abolished; the law laying down death for adultery and apostasy was
replaced; drinking alcohol and eating pork were no longer recognised as
cognisable offences; and so on.
Thus, any reforms in the MPL would not be tantamount to
tampering with the Shari’a as the MPL was not to be regarded as synonymous
with the Shari’a in all respects. To quote Fyzee, ‘In every age and in every
country, the Shari’a has been the subject of constant study, examination,
and exposition, and these expositions being human and imperfect, and relate
to time and circumstance, vary from country to country and age to age.’
Hence, he added, ‘it is submitted that it is futile to argue that where a certain
rule of law, as applied by the Courts in India, needs a change, we are
interfering with an immutable rule of divine law’ (1971).
Nevertheless, it is very clear that much of the ongoing debate on
the MPL centres on the appropriate method for divorce and the rights of
divorced women. While the Board continues to insist on the legitimacy of
pronouncing the word talaq thrice in one sitting (although it has been forced
to admit that this method is not the most appropriate) and limits maintenance
rights for divorced women to just three months, Niaz in her article
‘Maintenance After Divorce: A Major Concern of Muslim Women’ points
out that women should read the Qur’an to come up with startlingly different
conclusions.
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Thus the single-minded focus on personal law that has marked public debates
is an insufficient, even skewed, approach. If women are empowered as
individuals, with access to education and employment, they would
themselves be better equipped to fight for their rights and promote reform.
Hasan and Menon recognise that this ‘disproportionate emphasis’
on the gender bias of personal law has led to the neglect of the secular
discourse of development. They argue that to understand Muslim women
better, it is important to locate them within the broader context of economic,
political and other interests, and recognise that their ‘disadvantage,
discrimination and disempowerment are experienced at specific and
particular intersections of class, caste, gender and community’ (Phlipose
2004).
There is no doubt that all the intricacies of the Sharia are quite
fascinating. The main point, though, is not what the Sharia prescribes and
proscribes – the real issue is, why and on what basis can it allow a community
to dictate its own parallel judicial system? Whether the Shariah or the Quran
should decide the legal arrangements of modern nation-states or the
constitutions need to be decided democratically in order to serve the interests
of all citizens. Why should women approach these courts in matrimonial
matters when there is a provision for civil courts?
Empirical Findings
First, I would like to discuss some of the facts about Shariat Courts (darul
Qazas), their aims and objectives, functioning, and so on, and second, discuss
the experience of divorced women who approached these courts, the
problems they faced, and the justice that was meted out to them. An
interview with the naib Qazi of Imart-e Sharia Phulwari sahrif, Bihar (which
covers the regions of Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal) and Darul Qaza,
Muzafferpur (Muzafferpur, Stamarhi and Vaisahali districts) was also taken
to highlight the courts’ claim that they provide justice to women, and the
existing reality. The women went to these courts for fask (filed a petition
for divorce by ‘faskh’ or by the action of a Shari’a [Islamic law] court),
khula and maintenance.
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Imarate-Sharia was established in 1921 with these objectives:
v Ensure applications of Islamic laws, as far as possible, particularly
laws relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, Khula, etc., in their
original Islamic form.
v Establish the Islamic system of life on the lines laid down by the
prophet so that Muslims may live within the framework of Islamic
laws.
v Safeguard and look after Muslim interests and rights.
v Unite all Muslims strictly on the basis of the Kalima, even if they
adhered to different schools of law.
Here we are concerned mainly with the first two objectives of the court,
which to my mind are directly related to the rights of women under Islam
and the existing reality on the one hand, and regulating the lives of Muslims
within the framework of Islamic laws in a secular democratic state on the
other. We would like to elaborate more on this. For instance, take the first
objective of the Shariat Court, where it says ‘ensure application of original
Islamic laws ……’. In a democratic secular state, only the personal laws of
different communities are applied, not the Islamic laws. As far as Muslims
are concerned, they are governed by the Muslim Personal Law Shariat Act
1937, which is not the original Islamic law as far as matrimony and
inheritance are concerned. For instance, the pronouncement and validity
of triple talaq at one go is certainly not the Islamic/quranic way of
pronouncing divorce, but is considered so in practice. Another example is
the 1937 Act related to inheritance, in which it excluded a critical form of
property - agricultural land and women’s entitlement to it - which is
certainly not what the Quran says about inheritance (Chapter 2, Ai-Baqarah
and Chapter 4, An-Nissaa; a total of 14 verses), but is the interpretation of
various schools of jurisprudence that relate to inheritance in the Quran,
and not from the Quran itself. This is evident from the fact that Indian
Muslims from southern states extended the 1937 Act to include agricultural
land by deleting the phrase ‘save questions relating to agricultural land’.
For instance, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh did so in 1949,
and Kerala followed in 1963. However, in many other states like Delhi,
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir,
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highly discriminatory tenurial laws and customs, which are at considerable
variance with the Shariat, continue. These virtually exclude women from
rights in agricultural land. More specifically, in UP, which has one-sixth of
India’s population, Muslim women’s land rights are still subject to the UP
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950. Section 171 of the Act,
which defines succession to a man’s land, gives primacy to male lineal
descendants in the male line of descent. Only in their absence can a widow
qualify. Daughters come lower in the hierarchy. These tenurial laws in
Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, HP and J&K are contrary to the rights promised to
Muslim women by Islamic law.
Hence, our argument is that Shariat courts, as they claim, cannot
ensure the application of Islamic laws in India mainly for two reasons: first,
the Shariat Application Act is not totally in accordance with the Quran, as
is evident from the changes other states have carried out in the laws on
inheritance, and second, in a democratic state Islamic law cannot be applied.
Now we would like mention the Darul Qazas (here onwards DQ).
There are 33 branches of DQs all over Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa, of
which 28 operate in Bihar, except for the main Shariat court at Phulwari
sharif. There are 24 objectives of DQs, but here I am restricting myself to
those that are directly related to women. The reason for highlighting its
objective is to see how far they are met in the event of a woman approaching
it. And if these are not met, what are the reasons for it? The objectives are:
Settling claims for separation on the grounds of non-payment of
maintenance and other violations of women’s rights.
v Settling claims for separation on the grounds of non-compliance of
the order of DQ for the maintenance of the wife.
v Settling claims for Khula.
v Settling claims for Haqq-e-hazanat (the right of the mother to rear
her children).
v Settling claims for mehr, alimony and maintenance.
v Settling claims for the return of articles given in jahez (dowry).
v Settling disputes relating to the protection of the interests of minors.
v Confirmation of the validity of a Nikah and certificates of marriage.
v Authorisation of Nikah.
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Looking at the data obtained from the central Shariat (Imarat-e-sharia) court,
Patna, with regard to the cases it had dealt with from 1993-2000, we find
that the cases of khula were much less than those of fask, that is, there were
33 cases of khula and 1,004 cases of fask. Out of 1,004 cases only 94 women
filed a case for non-payment of maintenance, mehr, and return of jahez/
dowry. The data for how many women received their claim was not available
with the court (IMS, Patna 2000). The qazi stated that the women who
went for khula did not claim any maintenance and mehr because they did
not want to live with their husbands, and compromised on the conditions
of their husbands. Data obtained from Darul Qaza, madarsa Islamia Jamia-
uloom, Muzafferpur, Bihar ( which covers three districts) for the year 2004
and 2005 also reveals that the cases of khula are less than those of Fask. The
total number of khula was four, while those for Fask was 40. When asked
about the reasons for a decrease in khula and an increase in fask, the Qazi
said that women are becoming aware of their rights and are not ready to
forgo or compromise their rights on mehr and maintenance. He also pointed
out that if women are not receive their rights despite the several notices
issued to the husbands by the Shariat Court, they come to the court to ask
for the papers to file a case for maintenance in the civil court. Thus,
awareness about their rights at both the shariat and civil levels could be
one of the reasons for an increase in the cases of fask.
During the interview with the naib qazi of the court, it was also
revealed that when a woman who has been deserted by the husband files a
case for maintenance, and when a notice is issued to them, they would
immediately come and ask for Rukhsati. The data shows that out of 1,037
cases of divorce registered in Shariat Courts, 248 men were ready to take
their wives back (Rukhsati) to avoid paying maintenance and mehr. It needs
to be mentioned here that these women were deserted by their husbands
on various pretexts like less dowry, not being up to the expectations of
their husbands, for not getting on well with their in-laws, suspicion where
the wives were concerned, the fact that some wives were more educated,
the wives’ jobs, and so on.
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Socio-Economic Background of Women
Out of the 20 women who were either divorced or sought khula and fask,
11 were from Ashraf families and nine from non-Ashraf families. Three
women were illiterate, nine had completed secondary education, and seven
were graduates and later completed either teacher’s training or Masters
with the help of their parents and took to teaching, and one was a post-
graduate. Almost all the women were from a lower economic class, and
their fathers either had petty businesses or were in government service.
Four of these women sought khula from the district shariat court,
on the terms and conditions laid down by their husbands. Since they did
not want to live with them, they accepted the terms. I would like to
reproduce a copy of a judgement of DQ to show how the process of khula is
institutionalised, and how the qazi never tried to put pressure on the husband
to follow the true path of Islamic teaching and give women their due,
particularly the mehr, which is her right. When we asked the Qazi why he
had never asked the women why she was condoning her mehr or why he
did not pay the mehr at the time of the nikah, he said it was not his
responsibility because the khula is initiated by women with mutual consent.
Dated 9 safar, 20 Hijri, the complaint Waheeeda Khatoon D?/O  md. Shoab
has condoned her mehr, maintenance for iddaat and all her claims of
matrimonial rights. And defendant Md. Arzoo S/O md. Akhater Hussain
has no responsibility against her wife. Now the complaint is no longer wife
of the defendant. After completing her iddat she is free to remarry and the
defendant owes no responsibility of her Mehr and maintenance for iddat
period.
The condition laid by the husband includes: the wife would not
demand her mehr and maintenance either for herself or for her children,
even if the children are minor, and the non-refund of her jahez. The reasons
stated by women for seeking khula were: husband’s suspicious attitude,
less dowry, mother-in-law’s intolerant behaviour, unnecessary restrictions
imposed on them, and so on. These women were married for five to 10
years. Some of them had two to three minor children, and the responsibility
was not borne by the husband at the time of khula.
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Ten women sought fask from the central Shariat Court at Patna. Out of
these 10 women, six were educated up to secondary school, three were
graduates, and one was a post-graduate. The reasons were more or less the
same as those stated by the women who sought khula, but the difference
was that these women were more assertive and did not allow their husbands
to escape their liabilities. They approached these courts, expecting justice
(experience discussed later). Among the women who went to Shariat courts,
six were victims of physical torture because of their good looks, which
created suspicion about their character, their high level of education, for
not asking articles/jahez from their parents, and for asserting themselves
and their social and reproductive rights within the Islamic framework. Their
husbands and husbands’ families disapproved of their educated status and
desire for independence, and curbed them by stating that since they were
well-off, there was no need for the women to work and meet men at the
workplace (the experience will be discussed later). They were repeatedly
told by their husbands and mothers-in-law that the only responsibilities of
the wife are to produce progeny, keep her husband happy, and behave as
per the desire of her husband. However, these women never received the
money to fulfil their desires as the husband’s desires were prioritised. Unmet
demands for dowry even after 10 years of marriage was another reason, as
some of these women were not ready to ask their parents for more. As a
result, they were subjected to mental torture by not being provided with
essential services and proper food, being made to do hard labour related to
agricultural activities despite labourers being available, by being shut up
inside the house without food and water, and finally be not being allowed
to meet their closest relatives. Through the intervention of neighbours,
these women got a chance to leave their in-laws’ houses and decided not to
return. Two of them filed cases on the grounds of non-maintenance, while
one did so on the ground of the husband’s impotency, which was very
difficult to prove (discussion below). Six women were divorced by their
husbands in one sitting without any genuine reason, and in the absence of
any witness. The main reasons were: not having brought enough dowry, or
because the demands for the same were not met even after 10 years of
marriage, not being up to the expectations of their husband (with regard to
beauty and education) and in-laws, despite their effort to adjust.
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When I asked the Qazi about the increase in the cases of fask, I was told
that this was because first, women are becoming aware of their rights,
particularly matrimonial rights related to divorce and maintenance, and
hence do not want their husband to shirk their matrimonial responsibilities.
Second, with the spread of education and exposure to the outer world
through the visual media, they are in touch with the development and
debates taking place around the issue of divorce and maintenance.
However, despite their continuous and repeated appeals to the jury
to get back their mehr, maintenance and jahez, none of the women who
went to the Shariat Courts for faske-nikah got it. After the final judgment,
which took almost two years (the case was with the district DQ for a year
and a half, but due to the non-appearance of the husband on the due dates,
the case was transferred to the central shariat court), and despite filing the
women filing several petitions for the return of mehr, maintenance and
jahez, the court was unable to pressurise husbands to comply.
The women who were divorced by their husbands did not get their
jahez and maintenance even for the iddat period, and only two of them got
their mehr. Since there was no nikahnama and no witness at the time of
the pronouncement of divorce, they were deprived of their matrimonial
rights. They did approach the DQ, but in the absence of any proof/witness
of their divorce and, moreover, the absence of their husbands on the dates
fixed by the court for the hearing, the case was dismissed.
As far as the custody and maintenance of children were concerned,
in 18 cases, the husband neither claimed the child nor provided any
maintenance for bringing up the minor. The sole responsibility for the
women and the children lay with the women’s parents, some of whom
were retired or had petty businesses. Interestingly, none of these women
remarried, while all the men did so after their divorce with handsome
dowries. Six of the divorced women were working and looking after their
children, while the rest of them were dependent on their parents.
Hence, we strongly feel that it is high time that the AIMPLB, instead
of focusing on DQ, pay attention to reformulating the nikahnama to make
it more gender-just, and incorporate the suggestions given by women’s
organisations, which have been working on the issue of divorce and
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maintenance of Muslim women and the practical difficulties they have been
facing in the society with regard to their survival and status.
Experiences of women and the claim of AIMPLB for Darul Qaza
In this section I will elaborate on the claim of the AIMPLB for establishing
and strengthening Darul Qazas for providing quick justice to women as per
the Islamic provision. I would also like to mention the various objectives of
darul qazas functioning in various parts of Bihar, particularly Muzafferpur
and Patna, where women went for justice.
The women who filed the cases of fask had various reasons for doing
so, as stated earlier. While talking to women who sought faske-nikah about
their experience in these courts, they stated that they were under the
impression that when it came to seeking divorce and settling maintenance/
mehr and other matrimonial rights, the proceedings would be less time-
consuming, less expensive, and, above all, the judgment would be more in
line with quranic prescriptions. However, their expectations were wrong.
Salma (name changed) explained that it was very difficult to face the Qazi,
not because she was wrong and did not have any proof for seeking fask, but
because of the way the maulana spoke to her. He was very harsh, and biased
against her. Further, the way they asked questions and pressurise only the
women to adjust was one-sided. Despite Salma telling him that her husband
ill-treats her and does not give her any money or fulfil her day-to-day
requirements, he kept on insisting, ‘Wo Tumhara Shauher hai uski khidmat
kerna, uska hokum manna thumara furz hai (he is your husband, to serve
him and obey him is your duty)’. Her father and relatives also supported
her allegations, but it was of no use. While the Qazi set new dates so that
Salma could change her mind, he did not say a word to her husband about
his furz (duty). In 90 per cent of the cases, the women said that they could
not express themselves or explain their problems to the Qazi as they had no
female member who would understand their problems.
This experience was shared by other women as well, who also said
that the Qazi was not convinced about the grievances they had vis-à-vis
non-maintenance, disrespectful treatment, doubts about their character,
and their not being allowed to meet their relatives, particularly male cousins,
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and not being allowed to visit their natal family and relatives. It was also
very hard for the women to make the Qazi believe their tales of the physical
abuse/torture they had faced on occasions when they had refuted their
husbands’ false allegations and argued with them. The husbands had behaved
in a very decent manner before the Qazi, even requesting the women to
not break up their families, but turned threatening the moment they
emerged from the court. They also pointed out that in the absence of a
female jury, they were unable to show the marks on their bodies as proof of
the cruelty they had endured, on the basis of which they had filed the case
for fask. Shahana stated that upon complaining about her husband’s physical
abuse for not having brought enough dowry (specifically a scooter), the
qazi, instead of warning her husband, actually instructed her father to
provide his son-in-law with a scooter in an attempt to make his daughter’s
life smoother. Despite her reluctance, her father complied. However, even
this did not work as the abuse continued, with her husband demanding
other things, which she refused to provide.  One day, on the pretext of
visiting a doctor (for which her husband never gave her money, but always
dropped her at her father’s house when it came to paying the bill), she
decided to not leave. After listening to her woes, her father filed a First
Information Report at the local police station about the safety of her
daughter, which he did not like and insisted her to go. She decided not to,
and filed a case of fask-e-nikah with the Darul Qaza, as going the civil
court would bring dishonour on her family, and make it difficult for her
two sisters to get married. Her father also advised her to file a case with the
Darul Qaza in the hope of speedy justice as per the rule of Islamic
prescription. However, her husband, instead of appearing in court on the
due dates, went separately to the Qazi and cleared his position by refuting
all the allegations levelled against him. The Qazi, finding the case
controversial, transferred it to the central Shariat court.
Shabana said that she had been under the impression that the
procedure of seeking fask would be easier as compared to civil courts, which
take at least two to three years, and she had been confident of getting her
matrimonial rights as per Islamic rule. But to her surprise, the process to
fask the nikah took three years. The judgment was in favour of protecting
her matrimonial rights, including maintenance and mehr, which her
24
husband promised to give within three months. However, till the time of
this case study, she had not received any maintenance either for herself
even during the iddat period, or for her children (two daughters, who opted
to live with her).
The women who approached these courts also claimed that the
absence of the other party on the due dates, non-perusal tendency of the
court to the recovery of maintenance; mehr and dowry were not in
accordance with Islam. After the final judgment, despite the Qazi’s notice
asking for a return of the mehr, provision of maintenance for the iddat
period and for children in case of minors, or who the ones opted to live
with their mother, the women have received nothing till date. When they
approached the Qazi, he admitted his helplessness by saying that since he
did not have any force or agency to recover mehr/maintenance, they would
have to take recourse to the civil court. Women approached these courts
thinking that there would be less hassle and quick justice in accordance
with quranic injunctions, but the reality was different. They pointed out
that to recover their matrimonial rights, they had to file a case with the
civil courts since the Shariat Courts have no power or civil force to
implement their judgment. In this process of shuttling for justice between
the shariat courts and the civil courts, the women had to suffer physically,
mentally, financially, and socially. Hence, despite the easy process of
dissolving their marriage, the right given to women in Islam becomes the
most difficult, which may discourage many women to start the process yet
to live a miserable life.
Women, particularly those whose children were minors, added that
on every hearing they had to take two male witnesses who were present at
the time of their marriage along with their father or brother, which they
found very difficult. First, it was difficult for the persons concerned to take
out the time and second, it was equally difficult to convince the persons to
do so. As the act of seeking divorce on the part of women in our society is
generally perceived as playing with the honour of the family, nobody wants
to get involved.
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The experiences of women and relevant issues around it
Thus, the experiences of the women tell a separate story, which to my mind
does not accord with the AIMPLB’s claims for their campaign of establishing
and strengthening Shariat Courts. I would like to again highlight some of
the objectives of these Shariat Courts in the light of these experiences. The
very first objective, that is, settling claims for separation on the grounds of
non-payment of maintenance and other violations of women’s rights, was
not fulfilled in these cases. The women, despite filing several petitions to
the shariat courts for settling their matrimonial rights after fask or khula,
did not receive any of their rights, and had to approach the civil courts,
which resulted in harassment for the women and her family. As far as Haqq-
e-hazanat or the right of the mother to rear her children is concerned, in
the majority of cases the men did not claim the custody of children,
particularly in case of minors. The women who were not earning enough
to rear their children did file petitions in this court to settle the matter of
maintenance for their children, but when the matter was not settled by the
court, they finally they had to seek justice in the civil courts. As far as the
return of articles given at the time of marriage, and the settling of mehr and
maintenance are concerned, the court was unable to settle these rights,
violation of which is un-Islamic as well as against human rights. Despite
the Darul Qaza’s claims of their ability to settle disputes surrounding mehr,
alimony and maintenance, women hardly got their rights. The court simply
professed itself helpless by stating that it did not have any machinery to
force the husband to comply.
Now the relevant issue before us is: despite the failure of these shariat
courts to meet the matrimonial rights of women, why is the AIMPLB
insisting on establishing them? Are women ready to accept this demand as
mentioned in its model nikahnama? How are these courts going to provide
more relief to women as far as matrimonial disputes are concerned?
To my mind, there could be two probable reasons for this:
First, maintaining and strengthening of community identity through
the Muslim Personal Law, and second, to counter the growing feeling of
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insecurity arising out of frequent communal riots, which result in the loss
of life, property and dignity of women.
However, the relevant point is that in both situations it is the women
whose rights and interests are sacrificed in the name of religion and politics
of identity. As we have seen in the Shah Bano case, where she was denied
her right to maintenance, a new law was enacted. The AIMPLB’s move will
further deprive women of their citizenship rights.
As far as the AIMPLB’s stand is concerned, for the average Muslim
women, a Board like the AIMPLB makes no difference to their daily
existence and their day-to-day problems of livelihood. Also, the Board’s
version of the nikahnama has very little meaning as in the majority of cases,
there is no nikahnama (Hussain 2001). Muslim women feel that the Board
is not a law-making body whose words are final, with all Muslims being
compelled to abide by those laws. In fact, it is just a coalition of around 400
representatives from different sects, which came into existence as recently
as 1972. At most, it can suggest a course for the community to follow, and it
is up to the community whether they follow it or not. However, it is the
impression of the common masses, particularly the illiterate strata of Indian
Muslims, that it is a statutory body of Muslims which has control over the
entire community, irrespective of their sectorial divisions.
At the same time, we do feel strongly that to understand these issues
concerning Indian Muslims, and their desire to cling to their community
identity through personal law, we have to look at the country’s history and
legal system. Nehru initiated a number of reforms, modernising and
democratising the Hindu marriage and inheritance laws. These reforms were
also applicable to Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. The reforms forbade Hindu
men to take more than one wife, prohibited child marriages, and gave
daughters and sons equal inheritance rights. However, the Muslim
community was exempted from these reforms.
An exception was made for Muslims because the Congress Party
had promised the ulema of the Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Hind, who had supported
the party’s freedom struggle, that the Indian state would not interfere in
Muslim personal law. Instead, the party and the state would wait for the
Muslims to voluntarily assimilate into mainstream political life, and thus
participate in the democratic nation-building project.
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Successive governments continued to make changes in family law, but it
was never clear if they applied to Muslims. For example, it was laid down
that if a man divorced his wife and she had no source of income, the husband
was obliged to provide for her in accordance with his income. The Shah
Bano case made it clear that the progressive reforms carried out to protect
the interests of women did not apply to Muslims.
Further, a nation ripped apart with communal riots provided
sufficient justification to the state for permitting contradictory claims. That
the constitution is ambiguous about the nature of religious personal laws is
indicated by the fact that the arguments both in favour of and against any
reform in personal law are based on its principles. This ambiguity permits
the state to act discrepantly with respect to the essentially similar claims of
different communities.
Thus, the necessity for national consolidation and ensuring security
to minorities outweighed the demands of personal law reforms for the legal
equality of women. Unfortunately, five decades later, the same arguments
have been forwarded by the state for not initiating any reforms.
It is also very clear that while the continued existence of various religious
personal laws do not serve any specific purpose for the state, the political
cost of reform will certainly be too high for the government to make such
an attempt. Most important is the fact that apparently, women as a class or
a group do not pose enough of a threat to any government to undertake
sufficient measures to improve their position, so no concrete legal step has
been taken by the government to improve the status of women, with the
exception of the Muslim Women Act 1986. Thus, on the one hand the state
has perpetuated patriarchy and added to the oppression of women through
its ambiguous policies, and on the other hand, the clergy, in the name of
community identity, has doubly oppressed them.
Thus, the exemption Nehru’s government gave to the Muslims was
based on the good faith that Muslim community leaders would prepare
their members to voluntarily join the mainstream. However, these
expectations bore no fruit. Instead, the ulema promoted the politics of
identity and isolation among Muslims rather than focusing on an
improvement in their social and economic status by pressurising the
government, despite the available facts and figures highlighting the
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community’s backwardness. As a result, the Indian Muslim community is
poor, and lags behind other communities in education and other socio-
economic indicators. As far as Muslim women are concerned, they are the
most vulnerable because traditional Islamic law on marriage, divorce and
inheritance is outmoded and inadequate, and does not protect their rights.
The recent order of the Supreme Court directed at the Centre and states to
frame rules for the compulsory registration of marriages within three months
was disapproved of by the MPLB. Basically, this was intended to protect
women’s rights over property, and in cases of desertion. Another recent
court ruling stating that a triple talaq uttered by an inebriated husband
shall be deemed invalid on voluntary retraction was taken as interference
with personal law. This move by the court was no doubt in the interest of
women, but seems to be untimely, particularly in a charged communal
atmosphere following the Gujarat genocide and the recent move of the
Gujarat government to demolish Durgahs/shrines in the name of cleaning
and beautification of the city. In this atmosphere, the Muslim clergy or the
conservative element of the community are bound to cling to their
community identity, which is maintained largely by the womenfolk. And
in this process of maintaining community identity, the community interest
has been overriding the gender interest.
Hence, there is a need to create a conducive atmosphere in which
the minority feels secure. Also, women’s organisations should be consulted
along with progressive community leaders before bringing about changes
to make personal law more gender-just.
Challeges Ahead
The challenge before women lies at two levels: first, at the community level
and second, at the state level. Thus, the foremost task before women is to
launch a strong countrywide women’s movement from within the
community to debate the issue of women’s rights, and after a consensus, a
strategy of reform should be evolved. It is very encouraging to note that
the process has already begun. For instance, in nikahnama, which was
prepared by women’s organisations, it was suggested that an advocate has
to be present during the nikah (marriage). However, the (Board’s) draft has
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only mentioned this as an option, which defeats the very purpose of this
suggestion. Since the Shariat courts have failed to safeguard the interests of
women, the option/decision has to be left with the women.
As far as the Qur’anic text and women’s rights are concerned, while
the former cannot be taken as decisive, how it is understood by the jurist or
theologian is equally important. As pointed out earlier, cultural mediation
plays an important role. Some translations of the Qur’an seems to indicate
that women are secondary to men. For instance, the word qawwam in the
verse 4:34 has been translated in 30 different ways, for instance as ruler,
manager, protector, supporter, in charge, etc.
In this key verse men have been described as qawwamun by the
Qur’an, and conservative translators took this to mean ‘men are rulers over
women’, thereby proving the superiority of men over women. However,
liberal translators do not accept this, taking it to mean ‘in-charge’, or
‘protectors’, or ‘managers’, and so on.
The Qur’anic text cannot be understood in the same way today as it
was centuries ago in a feudal cultural ethos. Thus, one great impediment in
bringing about change even today is the absence of a democratic ethos in
the Muslim world. The women still continue to play a subordinate role in
these countries, as in these societies the jurists and theologians tend to be
authoritarian, and lack a democratic perspective.
A great struggle is going on in even Muslim countries for the rights
of women. An increasing number of women are receiving education and
becoming aware of their rights, Islamic or otherwise, and demanding
changes in the law. In some Muslim countries, women theologians have
emerged, who have a thorough knowledge of the Qur’an, Islamic theology
and the shariah, for instance, Fatima Mernissi from Morocco, and Amina
Wadood and Riffat Hassam from the USA. Also, there are women’s
organisations like ‘Sisters in Islam’ in Malaysia. These theologians and
organisations are questioning the traditional interpretations of the Qur’an
with respect to women’s rights, and are developing a new female-oriented
theology that ensures equal rights for men and women.
In India, too, Muslim women are increasingly becoming aware of
their rights and are demanding legal reforms in matrimonial matters. The
establishment of the Muslim Women Personal Law Board and the efforts
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of various Muslim women’s organisations to read, understand and interpret
the laws from a gender perspective through the provision of ijtihad is a
positive step towards women’s awareness and assertion of their rights.
Groups like COVA, Majlis and Awaz-e-Niswaan, and more recently,
Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (2007) among others, have time and again
used various fora to claim that the vast majority of Muslim women want a
change in the laws that violate the rights given to them by the Qur’an, and
work for gender-just interpretations of Quranic verses in the chapter on
women’s rights. However, at the same time they want the change to originate
from within the community and from women, who have never been
considered as far as their rights are concerned.
At a public hearing organised by the Institute of Islamic Studies
and the Centre for the Study of Society and Secularism held in Mumbai in
1998, the overwhelming opinion was for the community to stop treating its
personal law as immutable. The resolution passed at the end of this meeting
told its own story: ‘It is resolved to open a dialogue with the Muslim Personal
Law Board in connection with necessary reforms in personal law as it
operated today in India.’ The resolution pointed out that these laws were
enacted by the British, and cannot be called Shariat law in the strict sense
of the term. It also pointed to the fact that there have been instances when
progressive changes had been introduced in the law. For instance, the ulema
led by Maulana Ashraf Thanvi had drafted the Dissolution of Muslim
Marriages Act, 1939, which had provided much-needed relief to women
whose husbands were missing. The resolution also noted the need for such
initiatives on the part of the Muslim Personal Law Board even today,, which
is apparently not an issue of priority.
The women’s groups are challenging the Board for its lack of courage
to take strong decisions. They hold that if the Board recognises the practice
of triple talak in one sitting to be a reprehensible innovation, how can the
same practice then be considered part of the Shariat? How can the Shariat
include or sanctify reprehensible innovations? Many women from different
Muslim organisations feel that maulanas or Imams of various Sunni schools
of jurisprudence were products of their times, but now times have changed.
It is the time we, the women of the community, reflect on the Qur’an and
Prophetic traditions, and develop new ways of understanding our laws.
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They stated that it is time the Board and the Ulema wake up to the needs of
the community and start discussing important issues like the empowerment
of the community, how to improve the socio-economic status of Muslim
women, and their plight during and after riots, rather than focusing on the
establishment of shariat courts.
Conclusion
It is, of course, not easy to challenge traditional sources of Islamic
jurisprudence. It would require not only great Islamic scholarship, but also
sustained effort in that direction in a conducive atmosphere free of
communal tension. We have to re-codify the Shari’ah laws pertaining to
women on the basis of the liberal, modern interpretation of the Qur’an,
and some ahadith that are in conformity with the Qura’nic spirit. Such an
approach, it is hoped, will be an instrument in the struggle for women’s
rights for practising Muslim women. This requires a great deal of research
among the authentic Islamic sources, which will require great Islamic
scholarship on the part of Muslim women activists in India. This process
has started, and needs to be strengthened and supported. Initially they may
have to face opposition from the conservative ‘Ulama, but there is no other
way they can demand change.
Second, the most important task before all of us is to de-politicise
all Muslim issues, which are detrimental to national integration. Muslims
should not be seen only as a vote bank. There has to be a sincere effort on
the part of the community and the state to improve the overall condition of
Indian Muslims. And if the overall conditions of Muslims improve, and
they are well-represented in all social sectors, the conservative element
would not get a chance to campaign for strengthening and maintaining a
communal identity. For this, an aggressive but meaningful campaign as part
of a larger project aiming at creating a critical class within the Muslim society
has to be evolved by Muslim intellectuals through a scientific and modern
interpretation of Islamic scriptures.
It has to be kept in mind, though, that reforming personal law in
India is not a simple issue. It has to be seen in the overall social, economic
and political climate of the country, and the insecurity arising out of frequent
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riots. However, given the external communalisation of society, it becomes
much more difficult for the forces of reform to triumph. But given the
manner in which women within the community are mobilising for change,
as is evident from the widespread reaction of Muslim women after the release
of the model nikahnama, the clergy has to agree on a gender-just
interpretation of laws, provided a conducive atmosphere is created in the
country.
Undoubtedly, the community leaders’ claim regarding the rights of
minorities and religious personal laws are based on the constitutional
guarantees of fundamental rights. They argue that the freedom of religion
has been guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution, and any change
amounts to curtailing this freedom. Even the Supreme Court judges are not
unanimous on the question of whether enforcing a Uniform Civil Code as
per Article 44 of the Constitution would violate rights under Article 25.
The Muslims feel that Articles 25 and 44 contradict each other, and there is
no question of enforcing Article 44, which is anyway only prescriptive and
not obligatory.
Thus, minorities in general and Muslims in particular refuse to allow
any change in their personal laws. Due to this, it is women who suffer. At
the same time, the irony is that even if women from minority communities
demand legal equality in personal matters, aided by the constitutional
guarantees, the minority leaders as well as the state remain unreceptive
because of the contradiction between the two Articles. Thus, it is not wrong
to assert that when minority groups demand special rights by virtue of their
minority status, it is not necessary that the claim of men are the interests of
the entire group irrespective of sect and regional variations. Moreover, the
demand must not silence women’s voices and marginalise them further,
preventing them from claiming their rights as citizens of India. A state must
take the responsibility for welfare of the minority within the minority, and
must not overlook the fact that these minorities are composed of women,
too.
Muslims must understand that Shariat laws have incorporated
human reasoning as much as divine injunctions, and that human reasoning
is greatly influenced by one’s own social and cultural ethos. A medieval
social and cultural ethos prevailed over Qur’anic injunctions and Qur’anic
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ethos. The status of Muslim women, which was fairly high, has come
hurtling down. And it is the high time that Muslims seriously reflect on
this, and bring about the desired changes in Muslim personal law in India
rather than talking about establishing shariat courts to resolve marital
disputes.
Further, the Muslim Personal Law Board, especially when it comes
to its rigid stand on issues related to family and gender, must keep in mind
that what is known as Muslim personal law was enacted by the British
government in the 19th century and was based, apart from Shari‘ah law, on
British procedural law and on various preceding judgments. It was not even
properly codified. The judgments of those days delivered by British courts
were influenced by the social ethos of the Victorian period, which moulded
the opinion of British judges, as did the prevailing and proven customs and
traditions.
Today, women’s rights have acquired an importance, particularly
in this era of globlisation, and this changing scenario at the global level has
to be taken into account while deciding cases pertaining to marriage, divorce,
maintenance and property. The irony is that it is at the sub-class level that
changes have occurred, and while people are taking advantage of modern
developments, at the sub-cultural level our social traditions continue to
deny women their rights. As far as the Muslim personal law is concerned,
in the absence of any codification it is the judge’s opinion that takes
precedence. Also, one has to remember that whatever the personal law, the
judge is bound to be influenced by the social movements for women’s rights.
No judge can ignore the rights of women in the changing dynamics of today’s
world. This is evident from the fact that despite the Supreme Court judgment
in Shah Bano’s case in 1985, the subsequent law (Muslim Women’s Act,
1986) overturning the Supreme Court judgment did not influence judges’
minds. That is why most of the high courts pronounce progressive judgments
in favour of Muslim women. For instance, the latest judgment was delivered
by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court in respect of the
divorce of a Muslim woman.1
To conclude, Muslim women are now making their desire for change
public, and are coming forward for a debate about reform/change in personal
law. They have begun raising their voices against the teachings of any clergy
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of religious board that contradict the teachings of Islam and gender equality.
However, the women’s organisations working for the rights of Muslim
women, especially in the area of marriage, divorce and maintenance, have
a different approach to and understanding of the functioning and
interpretation of these religious bodies. They are not ready to accept their
hegemony, as is reflected in the disapproval/reaction of women’s
organisations after the release of the model nikhanama and the establishment
of the Muslim women personal law board. Thus, the present situation is
different from 1986 when, with the consultation of this Board, the Act was
brought in. In the 1960s and 1970s, and even up to the 1980s, there were no
Muslim women NGOs, but now several of them are functioning and
campaigning for a change in the Muslim personal law as it exists today.
Now Muslim women have even formed their own boards and one of them,
led by Shaista Khan, has even declared that since the Bhopal declaration
was unsatisfactory, they will frame their own nikahnama and make it
enforceable.
The Muslim women’s organisations are neither ready nor in favour
of the establishment of shariat courts.
Further, with the spread of education and awareness among Muslim
women, pressure began to be built up for necessary changes in the Muslim
personal law, particularly with regard to triple talaq and polygamy, in
keeping with the demands of time. There has been continuous pressure
levied by women’s organisations to change the personal law in accordance
with the Qur’an (Engineer 2005). The women, through various fora and
seminars/meetings, have been questioning the Board for its lack of courage
to take strong decisions about the various issues mentioned in the
nikahnama, particularly those related to triple talaq and the establishment
of shariat courts. The women’s organisations have also voiced their concern
about the Imams of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, as in their
opinion these Imams are the products of their times, but now times have
changed. It is important to note that more Muslim women are increasingly
opting for modern education, which in turn makes them aware of their
rights and leads them to campaign for the same.
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Nevertheless, by omitting secular options like the judicial system, naari
adalats, nyaya panchyats and lok adalats when addressing marital disputes,
the nikahnama promoted the concept of Darul Qaza, Shariah Panchayat,
or religious scholars to act as arbitrators. This, to my mind, is not going to
help women, but will deprive women further of their rights as citizen of
India.
Endnote:
1) Fahimbi from Latur was married to Dagdu Chote and three children were
born from this wedlock. Fahimbi filed a case under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. for
maintenance for herself and for her three children. Dagdu Chote married another
woman, Kamrunbee, and had more children with her. He neglected the first wife
Fahimbi and her children, and did not pay any maintenance.
On receipt of summons from the Court, Dagdu Chote appeared before the court
and filed a reply saying he did not owe any maintenance as he divorced her (Fahimbi)
on 24 February 1995. He also claimed that he divorced his wife in the presence of
a Qazi and two witnesses, one of whom was Muslim and the other Hindu. He,
therefore, prayed before the case that the application for maintenance under Section
125 of Cr.P.C. by Fahimbi be dismissed. This petition was dismissed by the 2nd
joint Judicial Magistrate First Class at Latur on 21 November 1998. And the
maintenance application filed by Fahimbi and her three children was allowed. The
Magistrate maintained that the fact of talaq must be proved, as it cannot be accepted
merely on grounds of pleading.
The respondent No I, i.e., Fahimbi, maintained that she was unaware that talaq
had been given to her as it had not been communicated to her by registered post,
which was returned. However, a presumption was made by Dagdu that
pronouncement of talaq was communicated to the wife on 30 November 1992. The
reason stated in the talaqnama executed was that the wife had filed a case for
maintenance, and that she had insulted the husband and mother-in-law. Also, there
were differences of opinion, as a result of which they cannot run a family.
The husband had pleaded orally that he had divorced his wife as per Mohammadan
Law by pronouncing talaq in presence of two witnesses, though there he gave no
reasons. The learned Judges maintained that as per the Holy Qur’an, there should
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be 1) a reasonable cause, 2) it should be preceded by an attempt at reconciliation,
and 3) the talaq should be effected only if the attempt at reconciliation failed.
This view was taken by the Single Judge, and the learned judge had agreed with
the Gauhati High Court in the case of Zeenath Fatima Rashid and the Calcutta
High Court in the case of Chandbi.
The Aurangabad Bench formulated the issues as follows: 1) whether a Muslim
husband has a right to divorce his wife without any reason and merely at his whim;
2) whether the Muslim law mandates pre-divorce reconciliation and whether any
pleading by the husband in the court that he divorced his wife would amount to
divorce according to Muslim law; and 3) whether the husband has to prove in
court that talaq was duly effected. The talaq must be preceded by an attempt at
reconciliation. The Muslim law also recognises distinction between effective or
proper talaq and ineffective or improper talaq. Thus, the Aurangabad Bench of the
Bombay High Court concluded it is necessary that a talaq, even if it is oral, be
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